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Abstract 
This document contains the text of the 1998 Central Banking 
Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
on June 4th. It starts by asking what factors have been behind the 
remarkable retreat of inflation that has taken place internationally since 
the mid-eighties, then goes on to examine the contribution of monetary 
policy to this process, and concludes by commenting what can be learned 
from central banks' recent experience in seeking out alternative anti­
inflationary monetary policy strategies. 
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen: 
It is for me a great pleasure and an honour to be here today in a 
place as special and full of significance for any social scientist as is the 
LSE to deliver this year' s Central Banking lecture. Let me start by 
thanking the organizers and, in particular, the LSE Foundation and the 
Direction of the School for their kind invitation to speak before such a 
distinguished audience. 
When I was a student at the LSE, some twenty years ago, I learned, 
no doubt, many things that helped me grow both as an economist and as 
a human being. But perhaps what I learned that was of most importance 
for me as a professional is that Economics, far from being the "dismal 
science" claimed by Thomas Carlyle, is a powerful discipline for 
understanding highly relevant aspects of social behaviour and a most 
important instrument for serving the public interest. 
In this regard, I want to emphasize at the beginning of this year' s 
Central Banking lecture that, in a democracy, central banks are 
institutions which exist to serve the public interest, and that the best 
way they can do so is by providing a stable monetary and financial 
environment for the development of economic activity. 
Today I will focus on the issues relating to monetary rather than 
financial stability. This is not because I view financial stability as 
-7-
unimportant. Quite the contrary. Yet focusing on monetary stability will 
allow me to examine the relationship between central bank behaviour, 
monetary policy and inflation, which is the main theme of my lecture. 
Although economists are known to disagree very often, there is 
nowadays an overwhelming consensus that a most remarkable phenomenon 
over the past ten years has been the very significant reduction in 
inflation which has taken place internationally; something that at the time 
seemed virtually impossible to most observers. 
Just to give an indication of the magnitude of the change, in the 
mid-eighties inflation was running at 5% in the group of industrialised 
countries, compared to 2% today; at 35% in the group of developing 
countries, compared to 11% today; and at 7% in the European Union, set 
against the 2% we currently enjoy. Significant, too, is the fact that 
unemployment rates, though still higher in many countries than what is 
deemed economically and socially desirable, are not generally higher 
nowadays than they were in the mid-eighties. 
Given these stylised facts, two relevant questions spring to mind. 
What can explain the remarkable retreat of inflation? And is the present 
situation of low inflation a stable economic and political economy 
equilibrium? 
As the saying goes: "there is nothing more prone to 
misunderstanding than success" . Perhaps because of this, in recent years 
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there has been an abundant supply of popular explanations of why 
inflation has declined internationally(1) . One of the better known is that 
which places the emphasis on the process of international economic 
integration. Namely, stiffer foreign competition arising from growing 
trade integration would have mitigated inflationary pressures in those 
sectors and markets more exposed to such competition. And, at the same 
time, greater financial integration, amid the increasing globalisation and 
sophistication of international financial markets, would have considerably 
quickened and intensified such markets' punishment of countries 
pursuing economic policies not consistent with macroeconomic stability. 
I do not deny that the ongoing process of international economic and 
financial integration has certainly made national policymakers more aware 
of the repercussions of their actions and amplified such repercussions. 
I also accept that stiffer foreign competition may have resulted in lower 
price levels in tradeable and quasi-tradeable sectors in a number of 
countries. Yet I am not sure why -if this were the main explanation for 
the reduction in inflation over the past ten years- inflation did not decline 
but rather increase in previous decades which also saw significant 
advances in the degree of international economic integration. 
Admittedly, over the past ten years, the international economic 
environment has also benefited from the absence of adverse energy price 
(I) These explanations often appear in journal articles, and are 
sometimes espoused by businessmen. An articulate account of such 
explanations can be found in R. Bootle, The Death of Inflation, Nicholas 
Brealey Publishing Limited, 1996. 
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shocks, such as those in the middle and late seventies, and nowadays, if 
anything, we are enjoying the favourable repercussions of relatively low 
world prices of energy and other raw materials. Yet I consider the 
inflationary episodes of the seventies to be not only the result of adverse 
supply shocks. If inflation persisted it was mainly due to inappropriate 
demand management policy responses to shocks -and, in particular, of 
monetary accommodation- in a social context where price stability was not 
sufficiently valued. 
Consequently, I would like to devote the bulk of my lecture to 
expounding what I consider to be a more traditional but most important 
reason behind the formidable progress made in achieving nominal stability 
over the last ten to fifteen years. 
For me, the keys to the reduction of inflation are, on the one hand, 
the progressive perception by society, based on the experiences of the 
past, that inflation entails economic costs which are far more important 
than previously considered, and that its successful control is an essential 
condition for sustained economic growth; and, on the other, the 
progressive realisation by policymakers, and central bankers in 
particular, that activist demand management policies geared systematically 
to fine-tuning economic activity are ineffective for improving output and 
employment prospects, and ultimately have inflationary consequences 
which are detrimental to economic and social well-being. 
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To present these ideas in a more or less organized fashion, I will 
devote the first part of the lecture to describing what it is known at 
present about the economic costs of inflation, which may explain why 
there is nowadays a higher social preference for stability-oriented polices 
and policymakers. I will then turn to examining what are, in my opinion, 
the prevailing views in central banks concerning the main determining 
factors of inflation in the short and the medium term, and the conditions 
under which monetary policy may be expected to be successful in 
achieving and maintaining low inflation rates. Finally, I shall refer to 
what can be learned from central banks' recent experience in seeking out 
alternative anti-inflationary monetary policy strategies, and to the 
lessons which may be drawn and be of use to the making of monetary 
policy now and in the future. 
******* 
It is generally assumed that the costs of inflation arise when the 
economy deviates over a prolonged time from what is a situation of price 
stability, the latter being usually understood -following Alan Greenspan­
as an inflation rate which is low enough not to disturb the decision-making 
processes of economic agents. In numerical terms, an annual inflation rate 
of up to 3% -according to some prominent academics, like Stanley Fischer­
or 2% -according to most central bankers- is viewed as a reasonably 
approximate figure for what, in practice, should be considered to be price 
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stability(2). In turn, the reasons often given why price stability should 
be interpreted in a pragmatic and not an absolute manner are both 
statistical and economic. Statistical, because of the difficulties of 
measuring the true changes in the cost of living standards through 
traditional consumer price indices, which, according to available empirical 
studies, tend to overstate the increase in the cost of living by a 
magnitude that has been estimated in various countries at between 0. 5% 
and 1. 5% per annum. And economic, because -as originally stated by 
Tobin many years ago and recently revisited by Akerlof and others-
insofar as there are downward rigidities of prices and wages, a certain 
small positive rate of inflation is like "grease in the wheels" of the 
economy, allowing the necessary regular changes in relative prices to 
take place fluidly and thus improving overall efficiency(3). 
If we can agree that price stability corresponds, in practice, to a 
rate of inflation of, say, up to 2% per annum, the next step is to ask how 
the public perceives the ·costs of inflation. In this regard, detailed 
surveys -like those developed by Robert Shiller- have recently been 
carried out in a number of countries with a view to answering this 
question(4). These surveys show that the public regards inflation as 
(2) S. Fischer, "Modern Central Banking" , in F. Capie, S. Fischer ,_ Ch. 
Goodhart and N. Schnadt (eds. ), The future of Central Banking: The 
Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994. 
(3) G. Akerlof, W. D ickens and G. Perry, "The macroeconomics of low 
inflation", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1996. 
(4) R. Shiller, "Why do people dislike inflation?", mimeo, Yale 
University. 
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harmful overall inasmuch as it lowers the standard of living. However, the 
surveys results are much less clear with regard to how the public views 
the specific channels through which inflation entails costs. Consequently, 
from a strictly economic standpoint, it is essential to provide a 
theoretically convincing and empirically meaningful explanation of the 
various ways in which inflation erodes the public's standards of living. 
In past years, particularly as a result of the generalised increase 
in inflation in many countries following the oil shocks of the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s, a number of theoretical models have been constructed that 
are able to establish the adverse effect of inflation on people's standard 
of living and welfare. However, it is only recently that these conceptual 
advances have been coupled with empirical evidence corroborating that 
the costs of inflation are indeed significant. Let me then briefly consider 
the main costs associated with inflation, with a reference to the available 
empirical evidence concerning their magnitude. 
In examining the costs of inflation, the traditional distinction is 
between the costs which come with perfectly anticipated inflation, and 
those associated with unanticipated inflation. 
Concerning the costs of anticipated inflation, along with the well­
known "shoe-leather" and "menu costs", the most important are those that 
arise as a result of the impact of inflation within a tax, legal and 
contractual framework which is not fully adapted to it. As regards the 
costs of unanticipated inflation, they derive from the uncertainty and 
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volatility of the inflation process which puts "sand in the wheels" of the 
price system and distorts the allocation of resources. In addition to these 
various macroeconomic and efficiency costs, I would like to note that when 
inflation is not anticipated or when, if anticipated, it affects the public's 
economic entitlements and obligations, a significant redistribution of 
income and wealth ensues which tends to affect adversely those segments 
of society with less knowledge and fewer resources to protect themselves 
agains t inflation. 
Having mentioned some of the main channels through which the 
economic costs of inflation manifest themselves, let me say something of 
the available evidence regarding the actual size of the overall costs. 
The existing analyses usually start from the assumption that, 
regardless of the ways in which inflation may adversely affect an 
economy, to be costly it should undermine the level or growth rate of per 
capita income over the medium term. Given the diversity of approaches, 
geographical coverage and time frame of the existing empirical studies, 
it should come as no surprise that their results differ considerably. 
Admittedly, most of these studies may be criticised owing to the fact that 
inflation and growth are mutually determined variables in a general 
equilibrium framework, with the relationship between them ultimately 
depending on the macroeconomic policies applied in the countries 
involved. However, the results generated by those cross-country studies 
having a theoretical framework more firmly anchored in growth theory 
generally conclude that countries which enter into an inflationary 
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process, even at moderate rates, never see an improvement in their 
growth or per-capita income prospects and have a high probability of 
experiencing a deterioration in such prospects. 
Very recently, the question of whether reducing inflation to go to 
price stability is also beneficial when starting from relatively low rates 
has been the subject of intense research. In particular, I would like to 
mention an ambitious, forthcoming study under the aegis of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research which involved the collaboration of 
academics and central bankers from various countries, including the Bank 
of England and the Bank of Spain(5). 
The NBER project tries to approximate empirically on a 
country-by-country basis the net benefits of going from low inflation to 
price stability while also taking into account the output costs that may 
arise when moving along the short-run Phillips Curve. The general 
conclusion is that industrial countries tend to experience in net terms 
significant welfare gains when achieving price stability even if the 
starting inflation rates are low or moderate, say, 4 to 5%. 
Consequently, it is my view that the bulk of the empirical evidence 
is consistent with the widespread public perception that inflation erodes 
standards of living by reducing per-capita income or its growth rate, and 
by lowering the welfare associated with a certain per-capita income level. 
(5) M. Feldstein (ed. ), The costs and benefits of price stability, 
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming, 1998. 
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Nevertheless, it must be conceded that we are still far from adequately 
understanding the complex process by which inflation manifests itself in 
modern economies, and from being able to provide precise assessments of 
the true magnitude of the relevant costs. 
******* 
After examining some of the main economic costs of inflation, and 
reaching the conclusion that the pursuit of price stability is now widely 
perceived by the public to be a highly desirable goal, I would like to 
consider what the current views are, mainly in central banks but also in 
the Economics profession at large, on the main determinants of the course 
of inflation in the short and medium term, before proceeding to explain 
how these views are shaping the making of monetary policy. 
The distinction between these two horizons is important for a 
proper understanding of the inflationary process. Indeed, while in the 
medium term it is commonly accepted that inflation is predominantly a 
monetary phenomenon, in the short term price developments are 
influenced by a variety of aggregate supply and demand factors. 
Analysing inflation from a medium-term perspective, a most firmly 
established relationship in monetary theory is that the inflation rate 
equals, on average, the rate of monetary expansion which exceeds that 
which is needed to finance the potential growth of the economy. 
Admittedly, in the present circumstances of deregulation and continuous 
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financial innovation, it is often difficult to identify which specific 
monetary aggregate corresponds most closely to the relevant concept of 
"money" or "liquidity" -a problem well known within most central banks-. 
Nevertheless, there is a widespread conviction that monetary control is 
essential for achieving a satisfactory inflation performance over the 
medium term. And this explains the monetary authorities' concern, even 
in countries which have adopted very different monetary policy 
frameworks -such as monetary targets or inflation targets-, with reaching 
a rate of monetary expansion that on average is compatible with financing 
potential economic growth under conditions of price stability. 
But then the following question arises: if inflation entails 
significant economic costs for society as a whole in the medium term, and 
if monetary policy is the main determining factor of the path followed by 
inflation over that time span, what prevents a policy stance from being 
adopted that is compatible with achieving and maintaining price stability? 
The reply to this question is not, however, as simple and direct as 
might be thought. Indeed, far from being a mechanical phenomenon, 
monetary policy is a highly complex process in which a full array of 
economic, political and social factors converge and ultimately determine 
its course. Consequently, it is worth reviewing which factors may hamper 
the effective gearing of monetary policy in the medium term to the 
attainment of price stability. 
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Combining both recent developments in monetary theory and the 
lessons learned from the experience of a number of central banks in 
conducting monetary policy over the years, two factors prove to be 
pivotal: the difficulties arising from a structurally unbalanced budgetary 
policy, and the problems of dynamic inconsistency which result from the 
authorities' temptation systematically to exploit the perceived short-term 
trade-off between output and inflation in order to step up the pace of 
economic activity. 
Over time, an unbalanced budgetary policy which results in chronic 
structural deficits may lead to a rate of monetary expansion in excess of 
what is needed to finance the sustained growth of the economy under 
conditions of price stability. The most direct way, of course, is when the 
fiscal deficit is directly monetised by the central bank. This situation, 
which is characteristic of non-industrialised countries with high budget 
deficits and poorly developed capital markets, reveals that keeping the 
fiscal deficit under control is essential for maintaining low inflation. 
However, industrial countries may also experience the adverse 
effects exerted in the medium term by chronic budget deficits on the 
anti-inflationary stance of monetary policy. Indeed, as stated years back 
by Sargent and Wallace, fiscal deficits which lead to an unsustainable 
growth of public debt ultimately 1:H·.ill� monetary expansion and -possibly 
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ahead of time- higher inflation(6). And although it might be argued that 
there are fortunately few industrial countries currently facing the 
problems of financially unsustainable debt, the above reasoning is still 
relevant if it is borne in mind that in countries with relatively high 
deficits and levels of debt, pressure could be exerted on the central bank 
to keep interest rates relatively low in order to ease and lower the cost of 
financing the deficit through debt. In such a case, though not directly 
monetised the deficit is nevertheless monetised indirectly, with the 
subsequent adverse effect on future and -if the expectations channel is 
powerful- on current inflation, too. 
The growing consensus as to the importance of the macroeconomic 
problems arising from chronic deficits, both with regard to the impact on 
monetary policy and inflation and to the adverse effects on potential 
economic growth, has in recent years led the authorities in many 
countries to adopt measures to improve their public finances. One was the 
introduction in the European Union of fiscal discipline rules to regulate 
access to Monetary Union and, after accession, to prevent the emergence 
of excessive deficits through the Stability and Growth Pact. Another was 
the entry into force, only a few years ago, of legal provisions prohibiting 
any central bank financing of the public sector. Both are significant steps 
(6) T. Sargent and N. Wallace (1981), "Some unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic" , Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 1981. 
A fiscal theory of the price level is developed in M. Woodford "Price-level 
determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate" , Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 43, 1996; and M. Canzoneri and B. D iba 
"Fiscal constraints on central bank independence and on price stability", 
in J.L. Malo de Molina, J. Vifials and F. Gutierrez (eds. ) Monetary Policy 
and Inflation in Spain, Macmillan, forthcoming, 1998. 
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toward solving the inflationary problems which, in the medium term, arise 
from persistently unbalanced budgetary policies. From this viewpoint, the 
drive by many countries over recent years to restore greater budgetary 
discipline must have been a factor conducive to the worldwide reduction 
of inflation. 
However, it is not only the problems arising from fiscal policy which 
lie behind the difficulties that monetary policy may face in the pursuit of 
price stability. As I mentioned earlier, there is also the problem of time 
or dynamic inconsistency stemming from the temptation to which the 
authorities may succumb to exploit the perceived short-term 
output-inflation trade-offs in order to boost economic activity. 
Most of the theoretical models setting forth this problem conclude 
that the proclivity of the authorities systematically to run an 
expansionary policy to stimulate the economy simply leads to higher 
inflation without bringing any benefit in terms of higher output(7). The 
main reason being that once economic agents become aware of the 
authorities I policy, they adapt prices and wages accordingly. This 
prevents the authorities from achieving their real targets, and induces 
them to accept a higher inflation rate. 
(7) The seminal contributions in this literature are F. Kydland and E. 
Prescott, "Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal 
plans", Journal of Political Economy 85, 1977; and R. Barro and D .  
Gordon, "A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model", 
Journal of Political Economy 91, 1983. 
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One of the basic contributions which, in my view, the literature on 
dynamic inconsistency has made to the making of monetary policy is to 
permit identification of the factors which influence the size of the 
inflationary bias of monetary policy. In particular, this bias will tend to 
be present and larger: when there are more economic policy targets than 
policy instruments; when price stability is assigned little value relative 
to other policy objectives; when there are significant structural 
distortions and rigidities in goods and labour markets that limit potential 
output; and when policymakers are convinced that they are able to boost 
economic activity through monetary expansions. Let me briefly discuss 
each of these issues. 
One of the main problems traditionally faced by the authorities is 
that of having to achieve a variety of policy targets with an insufficient 
number of instruments. As originally stated by Tinbergen and as later 
qualified by Brainard, economic policy dilemmas arise when there are not 
at least as many instruments as there are policy targets(8). Thus, when 
the authorities' goal is to reach a high rate of economic activity under 
conditions of price stability and only monetary policy is available for this 
purpose, there is an overburdening of monetary policy. Under such 
circumstances, the lower the priority given to price stability relative to 
other goals and the more pressure there is on the authorities to shorten 
the horizon of monetary policy decisions -owing, for example, to elections 
(8) J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy, Amsterdam, 
North-Holland, 1952; and W. Brainard, "Uncertainty and the effectiveness 
of monetary policy", American Economic Review, May, 1967. 
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at regular intervals-, the greater the inflationary bias of monetary policy 
will be. 
In a context of multiple policy targets, another factor which 
-according to the models of dynamic inconsistency- influences the 
medium-term stance of monetary policy is the difference between the level 
of the economy's potential output and the output targeted by the 
authorities. For instance, if the authorities' target is to achieve the level 
of potential output that could prevail in a more efficient and competitive 
framework, while the level of potential output actually attainable is lower 
-owing to rigidities and distortions that preclude the smooth functioning 
of goods and labour markets-, this introduces an expansionary and 
inflationary bias in monetary policy. In practical terms, the more 
constrained the levels of output and employment due to the presence of 
market rigidities and distortions, the greater the social and political 
pressures for monetary policy to "do something" to stimulate economic 
activity. Perhaps, a channel through which the process of international 
economic integration, and the privatisation and liberalisation policies 
undertaken in the recent past could have improved the inflationary 
outlook is, precisely, by increasing potential output and thus reducing 
the pressures on monetary policy to expand. 
The final factor which, under the theory of dynamic inconsistency, 
influences the size of an inflationary bias in monetary policy is the extent 
to which the authorities are able to boost economic activity in the short 
term through monetary surprises; that is, the slope of the short-term 
-
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Phillips curve. Hence, the stronger the policymaker' s conviction, 
erroneous or not, that monetary policy can stimulate the economy in the 
short term, the greater the temptation to expand liquidity systematically 
and thus the greater the departure from price stability. 
However, before closing this part of my talk let me also say 
something about the short run. This is, I feel, important for gauging the 
actual ability of monetary policy to influence inflation during limited 
periods of time, and also for understanding what sort of considerations 
may shape the response of central banks to various shocks, even when it 
is generally acknowledged that achieving and maintaining price stability 
is a desirable policy objective in the medium term. 
In practice, there are several factors, in addition to those of a 
strictly monetary nature, which have a direct impact on the price level in 
the short term. Any factor influencing aggregate demand or supply may 
in principle induce a change in the inflation rate within that time frame, 
namely: fiscal policy, the behaviour of economic and social agents in price 
and wage formation processes, international economic trends, and import 
prices. Furthermore, experience confirms that, in many cases and for 
relatively short periods, the foregoing variables frequently exert a 
stronger influence on prices than does monetary policy, owing to the fact 
that the effects of monetary policy on nominal magnitudes tend to become 
fully visible only with the passage of time. 
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The short term impact of monetary policy on prices and output has 
long been one of the most widely discussed issues in macroeconomic 
theory. It is also of considerable practical importance for the topic at 
hand. In particular, even where there is a firm belief that price stability 
is good for a country's economic health, the authorities must also assess 
the magnitude of the short-term output costs of disinflation in order to 
determine the pace at which inflation should be reduced to reach the 
established goals or return to them in case there are inflationary shocks 
which disrupt price stability. 
True, there is abundant theoretical literature and empirical 
evidence concerning these matters; but our imperfect knowledge of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the diversity of national 
experiences in periods of disinflation make it very difficult to reach 
definitive conclusions on the short-term impact of monetary policy on 
inflation. The most we can aspire to is to set out some of the more 
generally accepted points, in the hope that they may at least act as a 
rough guide when making policy decisions. 
A first generally accepted point is that the impact of monetary 
policy on prices is felt gradually. This is due to the lags existing in the 
transmission of movements in official interest rates to market rates, to the 
gradual response of spending decisions to changes in financial conditions, 
and to the greater or lesser speed with which prices and wages respond 
to changes in nominal spending. 
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A second point of agreement is that since, in practice, recessions 
are very often preceded by significant increases in inflation, keeping 
inflation from rising through an appropriate forward-looking use of 
monetary policy is of paramount importance so as to have, on average, 
more stable output and employment conditions. Indeed, it is the view in 
most central banks that interest rates should be pre-emptively adjusted 
whenever there are signs of persistent inflationary pressures, so as to 
avoid having to increase such rates by larger amounts later on, with the 
correspondingly higher output costs. A well-know practical problem is 
that what may be clear to the central bank may not be apparent to the 
public if inflation has not yet risen. This, at times, delays taking the 
appropriate policy measures by fear of them not being socially understood 
nor accepted. 
A further point on which there is broad consensus is that the more 
rapidly agents adjust their inflationary expectations and the more 
flexibility there is in the setting of prices and wages, the greater the 
ability of monetary policy to reduce inflation with lower or no temporary 
output or employment costs, that is, the lower the sacrifice ratio. This is 
so because the more confident agents are that the authorities will stick to 
a less inflationary monetary policy, the more intense and rapid will be the 
adjustment of expectations. And because, when goods markets are highly 
competitive and the labour market is flexible enough to permit the rapid 
adjustment of wages, disinflation will be faster and entail lower output 
costs. This, in turn, lessens the short-term costs of going to price 
stability and makes it more likely that the latter will be achieved. 
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inflation rates. The importance of empirically assessing which of the two 
viewpoints mentioned better fits the experience of industrial countries has 
given rise to several studies which scrutinise the economic performance 
of DECD countries during episodes of disinflation(9). The conclusion 
reached in these studies is that, in general, the faster disinflation is, the 
lower the output cost tends to be. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that stringent disinflationary policies should be implemented, for 
although the total output cost is lower, the impact on social welfare could 
be greater as costs are concentrated in a shorter period. Consequently, 
a resolute but gradual implementation of disinflation policies -consistent 
with interest rate smoothing practices- would seem to be a reasonable 
alternative, especially taking into account the uncertain knowledge that 
policymakers have about the structure of the economy. 
******* 
From the foregoing analysis of the interaction between monetary 
policy and inflation at various time horizons, it may be concluded that 
policy initiatives aimed at strengthening budgetary discipline, improving 
the functioning of goods and labour markets and adopting mechanisms to 
reinforce the anti-inflationary stance of monetary policy, favourably 
contribute to the achievement of price stability at low cost. Since I am 
(9) P. Andersen, "DECD country experiences with disinflation", in 
A.Blundell-Wignall (ed. ), Inflation, Disinflation and Monetary Policy, 
Reserve Bank of Australia-Ambassador Press, 1992; and L. Ball, "What 
determines the sacrifice ratio?", in N. G. Mankiw (ed.) Monetary P� 
University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
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convinced that achieving and maintaining price stability is highly 
beneficial for society as a whole, the above-mentioned policy initiatives 
would not only improve the cost-benefit ratio of moving towards and 
maintaining price stability but would also make it easier, from a political­
economy viewpoint, to achieve this goal. 
Allow me now to devote the time remaining to comment on the lessons 
that may be drawn from central banks' recent experience in the search for 
suitable monetary policy strategies to effectively combat inflation. 
At the risk of oversimplifying what has proven to be an arduous 
and complex process in many countries, recent developments in national 
monetary policy strategies may be said to have been marked by the 
endeavour to find a framework capable of blending rigour and discipline 
in the medium-term monetary policy stance with certain margins of 
flexibility to respond to macroeconomic disturbances in the short run. 
This endeavour of monetary authorities reflects the desire to avoid 
two sorts of difficulties. On the one hand, the dynamic inconsistency 
problems arising from an excessively discretionary management of 
monetary policy, which make it virtually impossible to achieve and 
maintain price stability. And, on the other, the drawbacks associated 
with fixed or rigid rules which, by predetermining the course of monetary 
variables, leave no scope for monetary policy to play the welfare­
improving role of reacting to certain macroeconomic disturbances. 
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Given the above-mentioned inflationary risks associated with an 
excessively discretionary monetary policy and the problems with fixed or 
rigid policy rules, the idea has been gaining ground in recent years that 
a good way to ensure that the necessary flexibility in monetary policy 
management does not introduce inflationary biases is to assign to the 
central bank the primary goal of price stability and provide it with the 
necessary means to achieve it. In some countries -like New Zealand­
contracts have recently been entered into under which the central bank 
undertakes vis-a-vis the government to achieve a specific inflation target 
within a given time by applying the monetary policy it deems appropriate. 
The central bank authorities are accountable to the government in the 
event of the target not being reached. 
In contrast to the contractual approach -but with similar 
objectives-, an increasing number of countries have opted in recent years 
for the more ambitious route of introducing legal reforms that establish 
price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy in the medium term 
and endow the central bank with considerable independence for achieving 
it. This significantly reduces the risks of short-term subordination of 
price stability to other monetary policy targets, and allows monetary 
policy decisions to be adopted with a sufficiently long time horizon and 
independently from the vagaries of the political cycle. 
Indeed, as highlighted in an article which Professor Goodhart and 
I wrote a few years ago, the central banks of a fairly large number of 
countries -both inside and outside the European Union- have recently 
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gained a high degree of independence in the conduct of monetary 
policy(lO) . In' the specific case of European Union countries, the 
conviction that this was the proper approach for overcoming inflation on 
a lasting basis was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, leading to the 
establishment of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) which is 
fully independent to formulate and execute monetary policy so as to 
achieve and maintain price stability in the European Monetary Union as a 
whole. In providing for the establishment of the ESCB the Treaty also 
made it mandatory for participating national central banks to have a legal 
status that was fully compatible with that of the System. 
In view of the many studies that theoretically justify granting 
considerable independence to central banks in conducting a monetary 
policy that achieves price stability, it is particularly useful to review, 
albeit briefly, the experience of independent central banks in combating 
inflation. 
The record would seem to indicate that countries having a well-
established tradition of central bank independence tend generally to 
perform best as regards price stability. Of course, the question often 
arises whether it is central bank independence that favours price stability 
or, rather, whether societies with a high degree of aversion for inflation 
tend to have both independent central banks and low inflation rates. 
(10) Ch. Goodhart and J. Viiials, "Strategy and tactics of monetary 
policy: examples from Europe and the Antipodes", in J. C. Fuhrer (ed.) 
Goals, guidelines and constraints facing monetary policy-makers , Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1995. 
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But even if the ultimate causes governing the relationship noted 
between the degree of independence and inflation performance are not 
sufficiently known, the results available for various groups of countries, 
for different periods, and using a variety of indices to approximate the 
degree of independence, generally tend to suggest that central bank 
independence helps fighting inflation. 
In line with the above, if it is agreed that introducing an 
institutional framework that guarantees central bank independence helps 
to strengthen the credibility and anti-inflationary discipline of monetary 
policy, it must nevertheless be asked whether this is achieved at the cost 
of a less favourable performance by real variables, such as the level and 
variability of output. Fortunately, the available empirical evidence 
suggests that these adverse effects do not generally occur. Let me now 
briefly turn to the reasons why this may be so. 
Although it is likely that an independent central bank seeking to 
achieve price stability will tend to be less accommodating to certain 
economic disturbances that affect output, its greater independence will 
enable it to avoid those other disturbances which are political in origin. 
Moreover, it may be argued that insofar as the monetary policy 
implemented by an independent central bank enjoys greater a.nti­
inflationary credibility, the monetary authorities will tend to find they 
have more scope in the short run for countering specific macroeconomic 
disturbances, without running the risk that the public will incorrectly 
interpret transient changes in monetary conditions as a change in the 
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monetary policy stance. Finally, the increased credibility of monetary 
policy may also help economic agents to distinguish between changes in 
the general price level and changes in relative prices, thus prompting a 
more rapid adjustment of prices and wages to macroeconomic 
disturbances. This will reduce the need for monetary policy to play a 
compensating role in the short term. 
From the discussion so far, I draw the conclusion that endowing the 
central bank with considerable independence can favourably contribute 
to the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Nonetheless, as 
experience shows, the contribution will be all the more important the 
wider the support that the final goal of price stability receives from 
overall economic policy and the more rooted the conviction in society that 
maintaining price stability is essential for promoting economic growth. 
The increasing attention paid in recent years to making legislative 
changes to ensure that monetary policy can be conducted in a 
medium-term perspective and without government interference has shifted 
the discussion about which monetary strategy best performs the role of 
"nominal anchor" from a relatively technical to an institutional level. In 
this regard, it can be stated that once price stability has been legally 
established as the primary goal of monetary policy and the central bank 
granted an independent status, the resulting strengthening of anti­
inflationary credibility provides more room for manoeuvre in the choice of 
specific monetary strategies (e. g. monetary vs. inflation targets). This 
may explain why a number of central banks, all of which enjoy 
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considerable independence, nevertheless conduct their monetary policy 
on the basis of different monetary policy strategies. In this respect, it is 
also of interest to mention that independent central banks with price 
stability as the primary goal of monetary policy look at broadly similar 
sets of information variables and have, in practice, very similar reaction 
functions, in spite of having adopted formally different monetary policy 
strategies(ll) . 
Still, it would be mistaken to conclude that the alternative monetary 
policy strategies potentially available to central banks -even to those 
enjoying independence- are equally effective. Indeed, given the imperfect 
knowledge that we have on how the economy works the most suitable 
strategy is that which, while adopting a medium-term perspective, tends 
to work well across different models of the economy, can cope with shocks 
from different sources, and can be transparently communicated to the 
public. Here, there is much to say for inflation targeting, pioneered by 
the Bank of England, and which has revealed itself in an increasing 
number of countries -Spain included- as an effective strategy for fighting 
inflation by making the commitment of central banks to price stability more 
concrete, visible and transparent. 
(11) R. Clarida, J. Gali and M. Gertler, "Monetary policy rules in 
practice: some international evidence", National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper no. 1750, November, 1997; and Th. Laubach and 
A. Posen, Disciplined discretion: monetary targeting in Germany and 
Switzerland, Essays in International Finance, no. 206, Princeton 
University, 1997. 
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******* 
I would like to conclude this lecture with a reference to one of the 
most important changes in the modern history of central banking: the 
establishment, three days ago, of the European System of Central Banks, 
which as of January 1st 1999 will be in charge of conducting monetary 
policy in the euro area, which comprises about 280 million people and 20% 
of the world' s GDP. 
Certainly, the ESCB has been carefully designed from an 
institutional point of view, having price stability as the primary goal of 
monetary policy and enjoying a degree of political and functional 
independence higher than that of any existing central bank. Yet for the 
ESCB to be a successful guardian of monetary stability in the euro zone, 
it will also have to show, from the very outset, that whichever the 
monetary policy strategy adopted, it is run sensibly, transparently and 
with a true European spirit. Only then will the ESCB ensure for the single 
monetary policy the understanding and support of the European public, 
whom it ultimately must serve and be accountable to. 
At the same time, European governments must implement the 
supply-side policies needed to improve the functioning of goods and 
labour markets and to reduce structural unemployment in the euro zone, 
while achieving a balanced budgetary position enabling national fiscal 
policies to play a countercyclical role within the limits of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
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This division of labour between the ESCB and national governments 
on the policy front is fundamental for the stability of European Monetary 
Union and for the maintenance of the non-inflationary economic growth 
needed to bring unemployment down and to improve the well-being of 
society. Otherwise, there would be a risk that continuing high rates of 
European unemployment may progressively undermine the social 
consensus for stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policies and that the 
problems that we think are now solved may return to haunt us, this time 
in a more complex economic and institutional setting. 
Thank you very much. 
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